It’s a rare kind of research that incites a frenzied panic before it is even published. But it’s flu season, and influenza science has a way of causing a stir this time of year.

Epidemiologists have long debated the pandemic potential of H5N1, aka bird flu. On one hand, the virus spreads too inefficiently between humans to seem like much of a threat: it has caused fewer than 600 known cases of human flu since first emerging in 1997. On the other hand, when it does spread, it can be pretty deadly: nearly 60 percent of infected humans died from the virus. For years the research has suggested that any mutations that enhanced the virus’s ability to spread among humans would simultaneously make it less deadly. But in a batch of studies submitted for publication late last year, two scientists—Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands—have shown otherwise.

Working separately, they each hit on a combination of mutations (five, in Fouchier’s case) that enables H5N1 to spread readily between humans without making it less deadly.

Efforts to publish those findings have been fraught. Critics say that making the methodology or gene sequences widely available amounts to giving would-be bioterrorists an easy recipe. They also worry that these man-made strains might escape from the lab.

Proponents counter that the threat of a global pandemic, were this mutated strain to arise in nature, is far greater than the threat of bioterrorism. Understanding what combination of mutations could transform H5N1 into a human pandemic virus gives epidemiologists a leg up on preparing countermeasures; they can, for example, test existing vaccines against the new strain.

As of mid-December, both papers were being reviewed by the government’s National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). In the meantime, most experts agree that we need a better way.

“Physicists have been doing sensitive, classified work for 70 years,” says Michael T. Osterholm, an infectious disease expert at the University of Minnesota and a member of the NSABB. “We have to find a way to do the same in the health sciences, without compromising our safety and security.”

This article was originally published with the title A Man-Made Contagion.

8 Comments

1. 1. paigekbrown 04:32 PM 1/17/12

   Great Article! For more about a man-made contagion, visit a Nature Blog post about the debate of whether this flu should have been created at all, and whether the results should be published in full, at From The Lab Bench Blog: http://blogs.nature.com/from_the_lab_bench/2012/01/12/contagion-in-real-life.

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2. 2. jgrosay 04:41 PM 1/17/12

   It was known from a long time ago that it's possible producing this kind of sinthetic disease-producing bugs, the experiment adds nothing new, just a danger previously unknown, and the whole thing is absolutely impossible to justify. The lab involved in this has shown they can do it, but they may have chosen an analog, but no-danger involved work. This is the kind of guys I'll retire all funding for keeping them on working, and disperse the team in order of not trying another similar experiment in the future.

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3. 3. Piume 11:44 PM 1/17/12

   The bird flu became a new topic in last few months.It found deadly for some extent and did not found a better answer for the problem.It appears from the wild but not known what is the eradication mechanism.

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4. 4. joepoppa 11:50 AM 1/18/12

   There is no need to publish the procedure in creating the flu; it is expected Mother Nature will do that on her own. Simply make copies of it available to high security labs, so they can research a cure. Wide publication would be akin to publishing a recipe for an atomic bomb.

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5. 5. bucketofsquid 02:43 PM 1/25/12

   How is this any different than all of the other mass murder weapons such as Sarin gas, arial delivery Anthrax or nuclear weapons? Many nations still make and stockpile such weapons so why would adding one more horror to the list mean much? At least this way we can make a vaccine so it can't be used widely against us.
   
   Or do you really believe that North Korea or Venezuela are incapable of advanced bioengineering? I doubt that this creation used radical new methods that no one can replicate.

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6. 6. greend101 05:36 PM 1/25/12

   The editorial “a man made contagion” in the February issue took a valid position but needs to be stated with more urgency.
   
   As this virus is much more dangerous than an armed Hydrogen bomb, it needs to be guarded accordingly.
   
   The best thing to do would be to destroy the existing virus immediately, and then place the information which gives the detailed steps on how to create it under the same kind of security that now guards detailed information on how to create a hydrogen bomb.
   Since freedom of information groups do not argue that thermonuclear weapons information be placed on public record, it is beyond foolishness to argue that the infinitely more dangerous biologic warfare information be made public.
   
   If the virus is not destroyed, second best would be to put it under government protection with security measures as great as those which protect our nuclear arsenal.
   
   It is necessary that scientists come to realize that a change in world view is necessary. Whereas previously ( in biology ) the benefits of publicly shared knowledge outweighed the dangers, this is no longer ALWAYS the case. The accidental or purposeful release of this particular virus could reasonably be thought to result in the eradication of a good fraction of humanity. There is no understanding to be gained from analyzing a live sample that is conceivably worth this risk.
   
   All the useful information (about possible vaccines and tracking existing virus changes in the wild) could be extracted from the genetic sequence itself , it’s the information that’s potentially useful, not the virus. And it must be understood that this is the single most dangerous piece of information that humans ever possessed, to be treated as such.
   
   We have changed the terrain here, and our mind set must change too. This is a question of scientists growing up enough to concede that the way in which they thought about public knowledge in the nineteenth century is not always appropriate to the twenty first.

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7. 7. greend101 in reply to bucketofsquid 05:55 PM 1/25/12

   The difference between this and anthrax is that anthrax is not transmitted person to person effectively, so when used it would only kill people in the area it was dispersed.
   
   This flu kills over half of the people it infects. Once released in any city it could spread over the world before containment was possible.
   
   The last pandemic flu killed about one in twenty people who contracted it and over the world killed about 100 million people.
   
   If you do the arithmetic for this flu with 10 times the fatality rate and twice the worlds population you will see we are in new territory here.
   
   Only the combined nuclear arsenal of the worlds nations could do this kind of damage, and those weapons have to be delivered... this flu would spread itself.
   
   So its not the same as the rest of the things on your list.

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8. 8. greend101 in reply to greend101 08:35 PM 1/25/12

   correction: the figure 100 million above is the largest estimate including the projected unreported cases in poor countries. The conservative estimate is 20-40 million. Our new flu working on a population twice as large with 10 times the fatality rate might produce
   400 to 800 million fatalities.

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