DEEP-SEA BLOWOUT: Stopping a blown out oil and gas well 1,500 meters beneath the sea surface required strenuous scientific efforts by the U.S. government and BP.
Image: U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
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Forty-eight hours into an attempt to muscle a gusher of oil back into the deep-sea well from which it spewed, the flow of petroleum and gas refused to slow. Screen after screen in a special room at BP's headquarters in Houston showed the oil gushing undiminished, silently witnessed underwater by remotely operated vehicles (ROVs).
The room—called the HIVE, for Highly Immersive Visualization Environment—was hardly the only place at BP buzzing with activity. Earlier, locked in the 10-meter-square "intervention room" on the third floor, scientist fought scientist in the battle over whether to proceed with an established way to plug the leak, the so-called "top kill" operation. Nobel Prize winning physicist and U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu remained unconvinced of BP's technical case, whereas geologist by training Tony Hayward, CEO of the British oil major, felt it had as much as a 70 percent chance of success, according to the President's National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling report released in January.
That might have been true had the oil been flowing at the rate BP and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated, roughly 5,000 barrels per day. (One barrel of petroleum holds about 160 liters.) In fact, such top kills had worked to control other wells in the past, albeit not those some 1,500 meters beneath the ocean surface. But, perhaps unknown to BP at the time, the oil was gushing at more than 50,000 barrels per day—meaning it had plenty of pressure to blow top-kill mud back out of the hole.
The scientist-versus-scientist clashes are just some of the new details about science's role in stopping the spill that have emerged in the year since the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded and set off what would become the worst oil spill in U.S. history. When BP scientists couldn't figure out how the blowout preventer failed, Chu suggested gamma-ray imaging, which could visually pierce the giant piece of equipment at the bottom of the sea. (It did the trick, revealing that the preventer's pipe-shearing rams had not fully slammed shut, allowing oil to continue spewing.) When BP engineers presented plans for containment caps or other operations, Chu and his team of independent hydrologists and geophysicists would question assumptions in a bid to force BP to consider the full range of possibilities, rather than simply hoping for the best. And when BP scientists failed to develop better plans, Chu invited other oil companies—Chevron, ExxonMobil and Shell—into the effort.
"Where the limits of reality lay"
The entry of Secretary Chu and a team of government scientists—pulled from the U.S. Department of Defense's JASON independent advisory group—began May 10, three weeks after the blast that killed 11 workers. At that time, they were there only to assist BP as it struggled to regain control of its well on the Gulf of Mexico seafloor. BP had dubbed the well Macondo for the ill-starred, fictional town in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude. "It was as if God had decided to put to the test every capacity for surprise and was keeping the inhabitants of Macondo in a permanent alternation between excitement and disappointment, doubt and revelation, to such an extreme that no one knew for certain where the limits of reality lay," as Garcia Marquez wrote—words that could be equally applied to the gushing deep sea oil well.
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12 Comments
Add CommentThe author really seems to be in awe of Secretary Chu. I believe a more detached evaluation of his role would lead one to conclude that he was of much less importance, and probably added a lot of delay to the effort.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThis timeline shows how the oil industry needs more stringent regulation and preventive measures. The lack of informed facts -- perhaps favored by the multiple players in the situation and conflicting interests -- led to an unacceptable delay in blocking the flow.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWe all know the environmental effects. Check out how it impacted the livelihood of local communities: http://ckne.ws/emLefc
Soccerdad-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisGood points. A lot more needs to be learned about what really happened those first 60 days and about who was REALLY in charge of operations. Also, with regards to "Chu versus the oil volcano", doesn't the U.S. still have THOUSANDS of top-notch physicists, engineers, oil experts and other experts in hydrodynamics and computer modeling??? Why no "Mahattan Project" approach, instead of literally a handfull of old guys in a room. One, who's main claim to fame was "quantum laser cooling"? Seems kind of strange to me. Why weren't AT LEAST 100 people involved in brainstorming this catastrophe? Is this what we are going to do if an asteroid is heading our way - have Dr. Chu and a few of his buddies handle it?
There are high school kids that could have come up with better things to do than "top hats", "junk shots" and "top kills" - it only takes a calculator to figure out that all things could NEVER have worked - and Dr. Chu and his "dream team" should have know this as well (and probably did). The public was being taken for a ride those first 60 days. When it comes to the "science", it's as simple as that. This was more about politics, liability and egos, than science.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhat I find most disturbing is 1) that the author cannot distinguish between "science", which had very little impact in the spill, and "technology", which may have helped end the spill, despite the almost total lack of meaningful command and control by either the government (local, state, and national) or by BP and its minions; and 2) why Scientific American cannot find a way to block the crap that shows up in comments 6 and 7. Come on people, monitor the list and don't leave it up to us to report the abuse!!!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisbob
OK, then please explain the "technical" merits of the "junk shot", "top kill", "top hat", etc,, that BP and the administration told (lied to) the public had good likelihoods of success - when they KNEW none of these things would work!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI am starting to getting corroboration of this below (much more to come):
http://www.cnbc.com/id/42675268
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/05/134268980/could-cornstarch-have-plugged-bps-oil-well (Thanks to the apathy of people like you, we might never know)
rab2411-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhere were the super-computer simulations of this disaster? I have never heard that any were created (maybe SA should ask this question)?
And, where were the independent government labs, such as, Sandia, Los Alamos, Lawrence Berkley,Brookhaven, Oak Ridge? Why weren't they brought in to help brainstorm solutions? Wasn't this more about who was going to be liable for damages, rather than about who was best equipped to find solutions and who SHOULD have been put in charge of the the science and problem solving?
What are we going to do if an asteroid is heading our way? - have some (incompetent) independent contractors (maybe the same ones with a reputation for causing problems) along with maybe 3-4, high level, scientists (some we don't even know), working in secrecy, behind closed doors, to solve that problem too? Somehow, that prospect doesn't give me much sense of security.
rab2411-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisSorry, I thought you were referring to my comments - my bad. I guess we may be in agreement as to your point #1.
No prob. And as to my second point in my original post, the references to postings 6 and 7 are no longer relevant, since my hitting the "report abuse" label seems to have helped the editors delete the referenced spam!! I guess we have to self-police after all!!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI also reported those (forgot).
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thiswww.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1378679/BP-oil-spill-Day-scientists-hail-recovery-Gulf-Coast-pictures-real-damage.html
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisHow S-T-U-P-I-D do you think we are, anyway?
Plenty stupid!
The author of this article does seem rather enamored of Dr. Chu. While undoubtedly talented in his field, what did he really bring to this effort besides double-thinking what to try and vetting their efforts? The whole thing seemed rather ineptly handled, but in the end they got the thing capped. They say. Next stop, paint all our roofs white.
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