The passage also aptly described the situation faced by the scientists at BP, such as vice president of engineering Paul Tooms or vice president and engineer Richard Lynch, who seemed incapable of determining how much oil was actually flowing and figuring out how to stop it despite valiant efforts. An early attempt born of the "containment room" ultimately created and submerged a nearly disastrous underwater balloon—albeit a solid steel balloon four-stories high and weighing nearly 100 metric tons—that became buoyant when methane-filled ice formed beneath the giant dome meant to enclose the well. The structure instead floated up toward rescue boats on the surface. Had attempts to steer it away on May 7 failed, a collision between a ship and the methane-containing steel balloon could have caused a conflagration as bad as the explosion that ultimately destroyed the Deepwater Horizon. Plus, this cofferdam effort preempted an ROV effort using sonar and acoustic sensors that would have more precisely measured the flow of oil and natural gas into the sea.
In the "intervention room," explicitly charged with messing with the well itself, the pressure was perhaps higher than at the wellhead. The converted training room had become something akin to NASA's Mission Control, the conditions at the bottom of the Gulf as hostile to humans and human efforts as the vacuum of space. Cables wrapped in yellow tape snaked down from the ceiling, sprawling onto the white laminated tables where they plugged scientists' laptop computers into grids of electricity and information grids. Diagrams of blowout-halting technology and maps of the Gulf served as wallpaper.
On the afternoon of May 26, BP technicians fired up pumps rated at a total of 30,000 horsepower and began shooting heavy drilling mud into the well. In addition, the BP team fired "junk shots"—a mix of golf balls, rubber balls and other detritus—in a bid to slow the oil flow. A BP technician read off pressure readings to those in the intervention room: 8,000 pounds per square inch; 7,000 pounds per square inch; 6,000 pounds per square inch (psi). Initial signs seemed good as BP ramped up the flow rate of mud to as much 70 barrels per minute.
But the ROV camera impassively showed the mud spewing back out of the well and onto the seafloor. The shredded balls in the junk shots were not clotting the flow of oil, and it was visible for all to see on the live video feed.
Chu versus the oil volcano
There is something of the owl in Chu's heart-shaped face—giving the impression of proverbial wisdom but also of a veiled raptor, ready to strike the intellectually unprepared. He may look oddly casual with his hands nestled in the pockets of the dark blue power suits he favors in Washington, D.C., but he attacks with questions. Even in the simple collared shirt with rolled-up sleeves that he favored for his time in Houston, the bespectacled Energy secretary posed a danger to the oil company scientists and executives, especially as he quickly acquired knowledge about the problem posed by Macondo. The only question was: Whose scientific expertise would prevail?
Secretary Chu could be forgiven for possibly feeling conflicted about his role: He had been called in to save an industry, while working as hard as he could to render it obsolete via programs like the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy. If energy could be personified, Chu would be among those who immediately come to mind, dashing from one global event to another—from the high-profile climate summit in Copenhagen to the prosaic opening of a solar factory in the U.S. Midwest—all as he penned peer-reviewed research for major journals and tended to his day-to-day political responsibilities.
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12 Comments
Add CommentThe author really seems to be in awe of Secretary Chu. I believe a more detached evaluation of his role would lead one to conclude that he was of much less importance, and probably added a lot of delay to the effort.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThis timeline shows how the oil industry needs more stringent regulation and preventive measures. The lack of informed facts -- perhaps favored by the multiple players in the situation and conflicting interests -- led to an unacceptable delay in blocking the flow.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWe all know the environmental effects. Check out how it impacted the livelihood of local communities: http://ckne.ws/emLefc
Soccerdad-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisGood points. A lot more needs to be learned about what really happened those first 60 days and about who was REALLY in charge of operations. Also, with regards to "Chu versus the oil volcano", doesn't the U.S. still have THOUSANDS of top-notch physicists, engineers, oil experts and other experts in hydrodynamics and computer modeling??? Why no "Mahattan Project" approach, instead of literally a handfull of old guys in a room. One, who's main claim to fame was "quantum laser cooling"? Seems kind of strange to me. Why weren't AT LEAST 100 people involved in brainstorming this catastrophe? Is this what we are going to do if an asteroid is heading our way - have Dr. Chu and a few of his buddies handle it?
There are high school kids that could have come up with better things to do than "top hats", "junk shots" and "top kills" - it only takes a calculator to figure out that all things could NEVER have worked - and Dr. Chu and his "dream team" should have know this as well (and probably did). The public was being taken for a ride those first 60 days. When it comes to the "science", it's as simple as that. This was more about politics, liability and egos, than science.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhat I find most disturbing is 1) that the author cannot distinguish between "science", which had very little impact in the spill, and "technology", which may have helped end the spill, despite the almost total lack of meaningful command and control by either the government (local, state, and national) or by BP and its minions; and 2) why Scientific American cannot find a way to block the crap that shows up in comments 6 and 7. Come on people, monitor the list and don't leave it up to us to report the abuse!!!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisbob
OK, then please explain the "technical" merits of the "junk shot", "top kill", "top hat", etc,, that BP and the administration told (lied to) the public had good likelihoods of success - when they KNEW none of these things would work!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI am starting to getting corroboration of this below (much more to come):
http://www.cnbc.com/id/42675268
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/05/134268980/could-cornstarch-have-plugged-bps-oil-well (Thanks to the apathy of people like you, we might never know)
rab2411-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhere were the super-computer simulations of this disaster? I have never heard that any were created (maybe SA should ask this question)?
And, where were the independent government labs, such as, Sandia, Los Alamos, Lawrence Berkley,Brookhaven, Oak Ridge? Why weren't they brought in to help brainstorm solutions? Wasn't this more about who was going to be liable for damages, rather than about who was best equipped to find solutions and who SHOULD have been put in charge of the the science and problem solving?
What are we going to do if an asteroid is heading our way? - have some (incompetent) independent contractors (maybe the same ones with a reputation for causing problems) along with maybe 3-4, high level, scientists (some we don't even know), working in secrecy, behind closed doors, to solve that problem too? Somehow, that prospect doesn't give me much sense of security.
rab2411-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisSorry, I thought you were referring to my comments - my bad. I guess we may be in agreement as to your point #1.
No prob. And as to my second point in my original post, the references to postings 6 and 7 are no longer relevant, since my hitting the "report abuse" label seems to have helped the editors delete the referenced spam!! I guess we have to self-police after all!!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI also reported those (forgot).
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thiswww.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1378679/BP-oil-spill-Day-scientists-hail-recovery-Gulf-Coast-pictures-real-damage.html
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisHow S-T-U-P-I-D do you think we are, anyway?
Plenty stupid!
The author of this article does seem rather enamored of Dr. Chu. While undoubtedly talented in his field, what did he really bring to this effort besides double-thinking what to try and vetting their efforts? The whole thing seemed rather ineptly handled, but in the end they got the thing capped. They say. Next stop, paint all our roofs white.
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