Once the cap was in place, BP prepared to conduct a "well integrity test"—essentially, shutting off the flow of oil and checking pressure readings to see if a subsurface blowout would develop. In the worst case a burst of methane could liquefy and collapse the seafloor surrounding the wellhead, thereby swallowing the blow-out preventer, capping stack and all. In a frantic, overnight session the government scientists assessed that risk and, by morning, they had decided such a worst-case blowout could be prevented with early detection of a leak.
So Chu and his colleagues required BP to monitor the well's pressure continuously for the 48 hours of the test and to keep tabs on the blowout preventer, the well itself, and the underground regions around it through both acoustic and visual methods offered by two of the 12 ROVs as well as a NOAA survey ship. Should a leak of more than 20,000 barrels be detected, or if oil pressure fell below 6,000 psi—implying an underground leak that could prove catastrophic—the cap would be immediately removed.
On July 15 at 2:25 P.M. Houston time, the test began. An ROV arm turned the handle on the capping stack 10 times, cranking it closed. For the first time since April 20, no oil spewed into the Gulf of Mexico.
Is it over yet?
The pressure of the well hovered around 6,600 psi, prompting Garwin, among others, to argue for the immediate removal of the cap.
Instead, a cell phone picture of the pressure readings graph was sent to hydrologist Paul Hsieh of the U.S. Geological Survey in Menlo Park, Calif. Working through the night, Hsieh determined that, in his best modeling estimate, the relatively low pressure readings were not a result of subsurface cracks or leaks developing but rather the fact that so much oil had already spewed from the well. Its original internal pressure of roughly 13,000 psi had diminished. The cap would stay closed.
With the oil staunched, Chu allowed BP to proceed with a so-called "static kill"—another attempt to push the oil back down the well with heavy drilling mud, made much easier by the fact that the oil no longer had a clear path out of the seafloor. Drilling mud went into the well again on August 3, followed on August 4 by a 1.5 kilometer-long cement plug.
In the end, however, despite all the resources of the federal government and one of the world's largest corporations, only a second well drilled at an angle and roughly five kilometers beneath the seafloor finally intercepted the base of the Macondo well and safely sealed the reservoir with cement. The first such relief well began drilling on May 2 and reached pay dirt in the third week of September, along with a second relief well that commenced drilling on May 17—at the insistence of U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar. "Our job basically is to keep the boot on the neck of British Petroleum," the former senator from Colorado said on CNN.
On September 19, U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen—national incident commander for the blowout—declared that "the Macondo 252 well is effectively dead" after spilling roughly five million barrels of oil in total.
What didn't die with it is America's thirst for oil: The U.S. consumes 21 million barrels daily. As a result of that thirst, BP has asked the federal government for permission to resume deepwater drilling in the Gulf. And, until the world's use of approximately one barrel of oil per second diminishes, it is unlikely that the Macondo blowout will follow the fate of Garcia Marquez's fictional town and be "exiled from the memory of man."
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12 Comments
Add CommentThe author really seems to be in awe of Secretary Chu. I believe a more detached evaluation of his role would lead one to conclude that he was of much less importance, and probably added a lot of delay to the effort.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThis timeline shows how the oil industry needs more stringent regulation and preventive measures. The lack of informed facts -- perhaps favored by the multiple players in the situation and conflicting interests -- led to an unacceptable delay in blocking the flow.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWe all know the environmental effects. Check out how it impacted the livelihood of local communities: http://ckne.ws/emLefc
Soccerdad-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisGood points. A lot more needs to be learned about what really happened those first 60 days and about who was REALLY in charge of operations. Also, with regards to "Chu versus the oil volcano", doesn't the U.S. still have THOUSANDS of top-notch physicists, engineers, oil experts and other experts in hydrodynamics and computer modeling??? Why no "Mahattan Project" approach, instead of literally a handfull of old guys in a room. One, who's main claim to fame was "quantum laser cooling"? Seems kind of strange to me. Why weren't AT LEAST 100 people involved in brainstorming this catastrophe? Is this what we are going to do if an asteroid is heading our way - have Dr. Chu and a few of his buddies handle it?
There are high school kids that could have come up with better things to do than "top hats", "junk shots" and "top kills" - it only takes a calculator to figure out that all things could NEVER have worked - and Dr. Chu and his "dream team" should have know this as well (and probably did). The public was being taken for a ride those first 60 days. When it comes to the "science", it's as simple as that. This was more about politics, liability and egos, than science.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhat I find most disturbing is 1) that the author cannot distinguish between "science", which had very little impact in the spill, and "technology", which may have helped end the spill, despite the almost total lack of meaningful command and control by either the government (local, state, and national) or by BP and its minions; and 2) why Scientific American cannot find a way to block the crap that shows up in comments 6 and 7. Come on people, monitor the list and don't leave it up to us to report the abuse!!!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisbob
OK, then please explain the "technical" merits of the "junk shot", "top kill", "top hat", etc,, that BP and the administration told (lied to) the public had good likelihoods of success - when they KNEW none of these things would work!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI am starting to getting corroboration of this below (much more to come):
http://www.cnbc.com/id/42675268
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/05/134268980/could-cornstarch-have-plugged-bps-oil-well (Thanks to the apathy of people like you, we might never know)
rab2411-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhere were the super-computer simulations of this disaster? I have never heard that any were created (maybe SA should ask this question)?
And, where were the independent government labs, such as, Sandia, Los Alamos, Lawrence Berkley,Brookhaven, Oak Ridge? Why weren't they brought in to help brainstorm solutions? Wasn't this more about who was going to be liable for damages, rather than about who was best equipped to find solutions and who SHOULD have been put in charge of the the science and problem solving?
What are we going to do if an asteroid is heading our way? - have some (incompetent) independent contractors (maybe the same ones with a reputation for causing problems) along with maybe 3-4, high level, scientists (some we don't even know), working in secrecy, behind closed doors, to solve that problem too? Somehow, that prospect doesn't give me much sense of security.
rab2411-
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisSorry, I thought you were referring to my comments - my bad. I guess we may be in agreement as to your point #1.
No prob. And as to my second point in my original post, the references to postings 6 and 7 are no longer relevant, since my hitting the "report abuse" label seems to have helped the editors delete the referenced spam!! I guess we have to self-police after all!!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI also reported those (forgot).
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thiswww.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1378679/BP-oil-spill-Day-scientists-hail-recovery-Gulf-Coast-pictures-real-damage.html
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisHow S-T-U-P-I-D do you think we are, anyway?
Plenty stupid!
The author of this article does seem rather enamored of Dr. Chu. While undoubtedly talented in his field, what did he really bring to this effort besides double-thinking what to try and vetting their efforts? The whole thing seemed rather ineptly handled, but in the end they got the thing capped. They say. Next stop, paint all our roofs white.
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