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Do we have autonomy, or are our choices preordained? Is that a false choice? And what, if anything, does physics have to say about that?
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45 Comments
Add CommentYour article mentions 4 arguments in the preface, but only lists 3.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisHere's a potential fourth:
Many-worlds. Quantum decisions are not random...one possible outcome of many is not rolled according to statistical chance: ALL possible results OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY, each in its own parallel universe.
This results in a possible solution to the free-will / deterministic conundrum: each copy of yourself has a perfect illusion of free will: you never experience a universe other than that which you chose, but every other copy of you, in other universe, chose something else, and each is in a universe thusly shaped.
That is, there is no free will because you chose ALL, but in each case, you have the perfect illusion of free will because the universe (that this copy of) you experience is the one (that this copy of) you chose.
Solved.
Are quantum events really random? It seems to me that every aspect of quantum events are precisely quantified. To be sure they're probablistic, but that's not random.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this@Xalseqsn: Thanks, I fixed that. I originally intended to (and eventually will) separate Aaronson's ideas into two separate points.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this@sonoran: Probabilistic and random are not distinct.
Could the difficulty arise from mathematics itself? So much in mathematics requires infinities, PI, e, square roots, irrational numbers, etc, but none of these numbers can be represented in any finite system. The best we can hope for are approximations, even at the most minute scale.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIt may be that by weaving infinities into so many of our fundamental assumptions about numbers, we are losing important information. At some imagined smallest scale, even simple divisions like 5 / 2 become nonsensical. 5 can be partitioned into {4,1}, {3,2}, etc but it cannot be divided into 2 equal parts. Perhaps this is important if we want to develop new ideas and achieve deeper understanding of where and how the quantum world arises.
IMO invoking quantum mechanics in free will is ridiculous. Free will and consciousness are products of the brain. To explain free will, we need to understand how the brain works. The brain transmits electrical and chemical signals through its 100 billions neurons and quadrillion synapses.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThe Goldman and Nernst equations govern this process of neurotransmission. These principles are derived from electrochemistry, fluid mechanics and classical electrodynamics. In fact neurotransmission is equivalent to resistance-capacitance circuit in classical electrodynamics. Therefore, it is classical physics not quantum mechanics that governs the brain.
Using quantum mechanics to explain free will is like using the theory of relativity in dam engineering.
gmusser - I think your response to sonoran:
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this"Probabilistic and random are not distinct."
is at best a gross oversimplification. As I understand, randomness implies unpredictability whereas determination by the assignment of a probability distribution infers that (at large numbers or energies) measurements are to a degree predictable. I think it is primarily individual quantum measurements that are random and indeterminable...
I’d like to understand the concept “random” better. “Random” refers to our lack of knowing the interplay of causes and effects. So, throwing dice produces a random number. It is random in the sense that I am not clever enough to throw a specific number. If I knew all of the little causes and effects that produce a number, then throwing dice would no longer produce random numbers. If I understood air resistance against the dice, friction of the dice rolling on the table, the force of my throw, etc. I could throw whatever number I wished.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this“Random” describes how I understand an event, but it does not describe the event itself. If dice are thrown in precisely the same way, under precisely the same circumstances, they will produce the same number every time. So, “random” does not mean that objects interact willy-nilly outside of a path causes and effects.
It helps me to think of playing pool against an expert. To me, the banging around of the balls on the table is entirely random. I aim for the corner pocket, but the ball shoots off in an entirely different direction. To the expert, the banging around of the balls is entirely predictable. Ultimately, the balls themselves bang around governed by causes and effects with mathematical precision each and every time.
I'll just take issue with Pigliucci's use of "the exact state of the whole universe at one time", which assumes that it is possible to establish simultaneity between objects in motion with respect to each other, or at significant distances from each other. Does he deny Special and General Relativity? Two observers in different states of motion with respect to an event can not agree on "before", "during", and "after"; time runs at different rates at different depths in gravity fields; two observers separated by astronomical distances each see the other as accelerating away due to universal expansion, thus experiencing time progressively more slowly than themselves- and so on. For objects in relativistic motion WRT each other these problems are exacerbated.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI'll also point out that light (up and down) bound quarks are typically in relativistic motion WRT each other. Excluding the usual artificially imposed "instantaneous" potentials, causality seems quite difficult to keep track of in their frames of reference.
"If measurement outcomes depended on our experimental choices, we could never conduct a controlled experiment."
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIMHO that is exactly why "spooky action" cant be proved in macro world, say humans.
I am always puzzled by one aspect of this debate, which its lack of experimental verifiability. Without that, it has no scientific meaning.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisOrdinary, everyday classical chaos is so complicated that at its limit the only way to compute what will happen over a long period of time is to let the universe itself play it out and see where it goes.
Thus if a billiard ball bounces off enough walls, the small irregularities of those walls will ensure that any initial prediction of its path will fail, no matter how carefully that initial model is done.
Considering that every molecule in a gas or liquid is a lot like a billiard ball -- yes, even if it started out quantum entangled -- it's hard not to come to the conclusion that there is an awful lot of intractable unpredictability in the universe at large.
So, if the universe is experimentally unpredictable in a way that cannot be circumvented -- anyone, am I missing something there? -- then how can theories that imply predestination ever make meaningful experimental predictions?
In the absence of such predictions, interpretations of theories that lead to the block (that is, predestined) universes become abstract philosophy, not science.
I find it ironic to see myself writing that because I've examined good old special relativity closely enough to know that it seems unavoidably to imply just that: that we live in a block universe of predestined outcomes. It's the only way to ensure that diverse frame views do not end up contradicting causality. The trouble comes in when you try to translate that simple implication into an observable experiment.
We live in cause and effect ruled universe, ie. deterministic. However, our choices are free, therefore, we are moral beings. Thus God determines and, hence, knows the consequences of our actions, but judge us in respect of our intentions, where human were set free, in how we act and respond to our environment and our own feelings
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisSloppy terms lead to sloppy conclusions, and sloppy use of anything makes a mess. There is a difference, yes, between things, concepts and processes. Talk about numbers. Talk about randomness. When you talk about "random numbers" you apply a concept to what? A number is not random. You can use a process that uses randomness, but the resulting choice, while random, is still a number, not a random number; only random in your process.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisNever mind 5, 3 is a problem; divide and angle into three equal parts - nope, darn remainders... brains like this kind of mental road trip, tackling existence and all; a wonderfully creative process, inevitably crippled by the limited physicality of a brain. Can anything accurately conceive of something larger than itself? Can I imagine a god that can't make a boulder he can't lift? Ouch; I'm just going to pay the electric bill and watch a Law & Order rerun.
Let's say there is a quantum fluctuation in a dendrite which gives rise to a tiny current. The neuron's other dendrites together had given rise to a total current just below the threshold needed to trigger an action potential. The quantum fluctuation then is the difference between the neuron not firing and the neuron firing. This particular neuron firing or not firing is the crucial factor in whether a certain action is carried out or not carried out. If this scenario is plausible, then quantum fluctuations may be relevant to human behavior, and thus to the conundrum of free will.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThere is no mystery regarding free will. This is the same kind of 'paradox' as the zeno paradox - it is no paradox at all.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWe are machines, and given a complete knowledge of our current state and inputs, are outputs are predictable. But what is the nature of the machine that could perform this prediction? It is one that is equivalent to ourselves. So this simply says that given our current state and inputs, we could predict our output.
Yet we feel we have made a choice. So what? We have made a choice. And the mental process we went through in making that choice is completely predictable. Given a complete knowledge of current state and inputs, and given a machine that is equivalent to ourselves.
I think what bothers people is they confuse 'predictable' with 'predetermined'. If our responses are predetermined, why do we feel we have made a choice? Why do I feel I could choose chocolate today, and maybe vanilla tomorrow? There is no contradiction here. There is no paradox.
I do not think it matters whether the universe is random or predetermined. Psychology has shown us again and again that human behavior can be influenced by very small events. Since there are many such events, we then have a choice about which ones we take action on. Before I wrote this, I had a choice of making an emotional comment, a thoughtful one, or just chucking it and looking for some fun distraction on the internet. I made my choice. It seems to me that it is those who do not think and self-control, who readily give in to any random impulse who truly do not have free will. Funny, though, how it is those impulsive types who seem to think that they are the free ones and those of us who pause to think are not.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this@nbecker: Yes, that's exactly my point. But many very brilliant people disagree, and I'm trying to explore why.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this@jtdwyer @sonoran: Random events still follow a probability distribution. I don't know what a single roll of a die will bring, but I do know that in a lot of rolls, each number comes up about a sixth of the time.
It's funny to see this article, because I had just a few days ago started jotting down my ideas on this subject (sorry, it's somewhat redundant with what I already posted):
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this* There is no mystery regarding free will
** There is nothing inconsistent about saying that you contemplate and make a decision, and saying that your decision was determined entirely by your present state and your sense inputs
You experience the feeling that you made the decision, and you feel as if you could have decided differently. All of this is still determined entirely by your present state and your sense inputs. There is nothing inconsistent about this. That you would go through certain thought process and reach certain conclusion and feel that you made this decision is in some sense predictable, yet that does not deny that it occured and that you felt you made a decision.
You feel that you chose vanilla today, and tomorrow you could very well chose strawberry. There is no mystery here. Your state tomorrow and the ensemble of all your sense inputs tomorrow is not the same as today. Tomorrow your state is augmented by the knowledge that today you had vanilla, for example. Tomorrow your decision is influenced by a suddenly remembering a childhood experience, and that leads you to a different decision than today. Nothing surprising about that - that memory was triggered by the external sense input and current state. In some sense, that the memory would be triggered was perfectly predictable as well.
** There is no external agency
Part of the objection to the concept that we are machines is that this means that everything is predetermined. In some sense, given complete knowledge of the current state and all inputs to the machine, the response of the machine is determined. But who can make that determination? Only a machine equivalent to you - that is, yourself.
** No simpler machine could have predicted the outcome
Your response is perfectly predictable. The machine that can predict your response is you. There is probably no simpler machine that can predict your response.
Any machine that could predict the outcome is equivalent to you - it is you.
Dice are specifically designed to be probabilistically determined - as that is their function.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisDetermining how often grains of sand lay with their smoothest facet in the 'up' position would be much more difficult - its degree of indeterminable randomness would much greater than the outcome of a roll of the dice.
IMO, equations that constrain the probability distributions for occurrences of quantum events incorporate some knowledge of the deterministic processes that produce the specific measurement events. Likewise, the odds of rolling a 1 can be calculated because the number of sides and unique numbers of dots are known.
As I understand, there still some ongoing debate regarding quantum determinism. As the wikipedia entry:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretation_of_quantum_mechanics
states,
"An interpretation of quantum mechanics is a set of statements which attempt to explain how quantum mechanics informs our understanding of nature. Although quantum mechanics has held up to rigorous and thorough experimental testing, many of these experiments are open to different interpretations. There exist a number of contending schools of thought, differing over whether quantum mechanics can be understood to be deterministic, which elements of quantum mechanics can be considered "real", and other matters."
"This question is of special interest to philosophers of physics, as physicists continue to show a strong interest in the subject. They usually consider an interpretation of quantum mechanics as an interpretation of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, specifying the physical meaning of the mathematical entities of the theory."
Perhaps my more colloquial understanding of random is different from the mathematical meaning.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisFor example if you take a single atom of Bismuth 212 it has a 36% probability to decay Thallum 208 and 64% probability to decay to Polonium. Would you consider the decay pathway of a single Bismuth nuclide to be random?
It is indeterminate, but to me random means with no ability to quantify even probablistic outcomes. Again maybe my understanding of the term is at fault.
That competent experts disagree on the issue is enough to caution us to proceed scientifically on this matter.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thishttp://blogdredd.blogspot.com/2009/11/memes-of-penrose.html
"Any machine that could predict the outcome is equivalent to you - it is you". Prediction is based upon past, which is different from intention. As someone who experienced that when planing to say something, said something else would understand (the movie "Inception" was playing on this idea). No one knows your intention, except yourself and God.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this"Human consciousness and therefore the concept of free will are emergent properties"
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWhat do you think they are emerging from?
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I'm still thinking about what you and nbecker are saying (as far as I can tell)
"our state and all inputs"
I think if we could know our state and all our inputs then we could determine our actions, but I don't think we can't "fully" know our state and all our inputs therefore we can't "fully" determine our actions
Can I assume we all have a will that seems to vary in freeness, or effectiveness, depending on the task we are willing and the context we are trying to will it in
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If quantum fluctuations can fire a tiny current in your bread toaster, then quantum fluctuation may be relevant to home appliance electrical engineering. But we don't use quantum physics to design a bread toaster. Classical electromagnetic theory will do. Of course if you're a philosopher-writer, speculating on the quantum mysteries of the bread toaster would be a good read.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIMO the fuss about free will and quantum mechanics is metaphysics. If you want a serious discussion on free will, I would listen to people who study the brain and human behavior - neurologists and psychologists.
"Yes, that's exactly my point. But many very brilliant people disagree, and I'm trying to explore why"
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI presume these very brilliant people are theoretical physicists and philosophers. Why not explore if neurologists and psychologists think quantum physics is relevant to free will? Are they not very brilliant?
To Terry Bollinger - you take all the fun out of this discussion. Your letter is probably the best expression I have read of the impossibility of this search. I started at 16 and am now 65. I have had the discussion with smart people and not so smart people. And whether you are a scientist or a philosopher, it always boils down to the question of "God or not God". And the answer is...
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisArgument #4 (time-symmetry in a deterministic universe) is spurious, because people's and animal's decisions are imprecisely placed in spacetime. Over time (forwards or backwads) even a tiny imprecision can deterministically dilute to no effect or be blown up to chaotic consequences. The small scope of our choices can sometimes also add to the uncertainty. Therefore, one cannot prove in this way that we can determine any earlier cosmological conditions (not to mention the initial ones, whatever we understand by initializing).
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIn theology, the subject of free will, pre-destination, and the apparent conflict in God being out of time always knowing what a person will do, but without this meaning that our acts are forced, has been discussed for centuries. Any priest entering the discussion ?.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisAny observation of events in a system does produce an interference in its results, as you can't have information about the system without some kind of input or output energy interchange with the system, this would be ever some kind of Maxwell's demon. I was told once: "If you were exactly in the same situation you were when you made a decision, you'll make again the same choice". Does this have a quantum physics support or rationale ?.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisWe don't use quantum physics to design a Geiger counter, or for that matter the detectors at the Large Hadron Collider, either, but they directly reflect quantum events. My point is that it is conceivable that quantum events might affect human brain activity, in which case it is conceivable that they are relevant to the discussion of "free will", which in my opinion is just one aspect of brain function.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThe butterfly effect means that quantum uncertainty would affect the outcome of the brain, but I fail to see how it would be any different to classical Brownian motion. Unless, somehow, the quantum fluctuations were all conspiring together to "push" your brain towards a certain direction, which is rather implausible and requires some strong evidence!
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThe fact that a brain can make arbitrary decisions sometimes, does not imply free will.
As research into human psyche has shown, human memory is partly past experiences and partly mind's own interpretation and invention. Therefore, human choices are not deterministic. However, human will inherently knows what it is doing, hence accountable to God.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisYour analogy of a Geiger counter and LHC precisely proves my point. If the human brain is like the LHC, then you don't need quantum physics to design and understand the workings of the brain.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIn the same manner the LHC is used to reflect quantum events without needing quantum physics for its own construction, likewise the brain can think of quantum events but that doesn't mean you need quantum physics to explain the workings of the brain.
BTW theoretically quantum events can affect almost everything in the universe. But we don't use quantum physics to explain everything in the universe because it may not be relevant.
If we lived in a deterministic clockwork universe, then there could be no free will. Allegedly, by introducing a source of "true" randomness, we open the door to free will, but I'm not so convinced. There are many interpretations of quantum uncertainty.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this1. Quantum mechanics is truly random. Then surely the quantum processes are out of our control - we do not control our destinies after all. Our destiny is random, not controlled by us.
2. Quantum mechanics is actually deterministic. Then we are back to the clockwork universe again, and we have no free will.
3. Many worlds - all outcomes happen. Then, all outcomes are predetermined and we have no free will.
4. Quantum mechanics allows God and the soul to exert influence over matter. There is no evidence to support this, but this would not stop people from believing it.
The focus on quantum mechanics in this debate is unfortunate, because it leads to a tendency to discuss highly technical details, whereas the fundamental questions are elsewhere. Quantum mechanics is just one out of the many scientific theories we have developed over time, and it may well one day be replaced by something better. The real question to be discussed before looking at any specific physical theory is how free will fits in with science.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThe basis of all science is observation. Theories are made to sum up many observations into a simple model that also serves to make predictions for future observations, allowing to test and refine the theory. Observation provides answers to "what" questions: what do we see under this or that condition?
Causality is not about "what", but about "why". Humans beings crave for causal explanations, we always want to know "why". But science doesn't answer such questions. At best it "explains" a phenomenon in terms of a simpler one. Science can tell you how to understand falling apples in terms of gravity, but it doesn't tell you *why* there is gravity.
So can science help with the question of free will at all? Can the existence of free will be verified by observation? How? Unless we have an answer to this question that the scientific community agrees on, there is no point in exploring the depths of quantum mechanics.
I see only one way in which observation could provide a clear answer to the question: if the universe is fully deterministic (call it "superdeterministic" if you want), and we can find the complete deterministic laws that make the universe tick, and we can apply these laws to data from observation, then we could predict everything that happens in the universe, including the behaviour of human beings in all possible circumstances. In that case, there is no place for free will. But we are very very far from such a complete understanding of the universe, and we may doubt we will ever get there. And if the universe is not deterministic, all hope is lost anyway.
Interesting approach, but I think its more fruitful to approach human free will on a macro basis. It's hard to think my choice of vanilla or chocolate ice cream is derived from some quantum effect. Free will may be better derived as emergence from the interactions of the various regions of our brains some of which are not in our consciousness. Since we are not conscious of some of the inputs to our decisions we are left with two choices: (1) there are deep, underlying causes of our choices, but we can't know them or (2) or the executive in brain is somehow able to manage (either partially or completely--in either case we have input.) the emergence of our choices.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIn the former case the resolution is epistemically impossible, it the latter (if we can sort through the idea of cause)we need to attribute to ourselves a power that is usually reserved for Gods, i.e a first cause. It's clear that both of the choices are problematic. I prefer to think that science can ultimately deal with the epistemic problem.
Musser: "Human consciousness and therefore the concept of free will are emergent properties, so whether microscopic physics is deterministic or not is irrelevant. To speak of a conflict is to mix levels of description. In other words, there’s no “you” who is steered one way or the other by initial conditions. “You” are a product of those conditions."
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisSomehow, whether I exist as a freely self-determining entity makes a difference to me. Your reassurance that I am simply how I am, doesn't help.
Quantum indeterminism is the necessary precondition for free will, I believe. The state of any system, like a brain, is determined by the solution of the Schrödinger Equation that describes the system, which is sometimes called its “wave function.” But the wave function of a system doesn’t fully determine its material form, only the probabilities assigned to the various states the system can assume.
That’s true In the case of our brain. Since the connection between brain wave function and the material brain is probabilistic and random, there is some freedom in the arrangements of our brain’s molecules and ions. That arrangement is expressed in our behavior. Thus, it is impossible to completely predict what we will choose to do, and there is the possibility of freedom of choice.
Our choices, the exercise of our free will, must occur in the non-deterministic interval between the wave function of our brains and our actions. The interval cannot be understood as a separation of position in space-time, and I don’t think the theory of QM explains the nature of this separation.
Within this interval, however, our free will spontaneously acts to select our actions. Another way of saying this would be that our free will is the agent of the randomness that selects the actual material state of our brain and the action we perform. I should make the point here that the concept of randomness entails only a distribution of outcomes and implies nothing about the mechanism by which it occurs. Nothing excludes the possibility that random events could be the outcomes of an intention. The only requirement is that if a large number of choices were made in a particular situation, the frequencies of actions chosen would conform to a random distribution.
There are a number of issues which, independently of each other, have a bearing on the question of free will: 1.The nature of time. The passage of time could be entirely subjective. Perhaps, in another dimension, all that has happened, or will happen, already exists. Is there any way (even in a thought experiment) that the "inevitability of the actual' can be disproved? If not, there is no way of proving that anyone "could have acted otherwise".2. What do we mean by free will? Is there any action that can demonstrate free will? All creatures act to follow an impulse. Is a moth circling a flame acting freely? 3. The strict causality of natural events. Extrapolating from subatomic events may not be justified.4. That we are not conscious (or aware) of any force (or internal compulsion) constraining or guiding our behaviour does not mean that such a compulsion does not exist.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIt is perhaps impossible to prove that free will (implying that a person is responsible for his actions) exists. But, to maintain a sane and stable society, we must act on the assumption that it does exist. In any case, we are 'hardwired' to behave as if free will is a fact. It seems to be well-established that, under hypnotic suggestion, a person can perform predetermined acts without being at all aware that he is doing merely what he had earlier been told to do.
I think if we accept that we can’t control everything it might be a good place to consider cause and effect without conscious pre-deterministic thought process. We might ask; do earthquakes and car accidents occur randomly? Actually after long term study I can state they don’t, but it what takes for a person to arrive at that place in time to experience either is nothing short of amazing as it comes down to nanoseconds at times, but what happens to them as a result is very profound.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThus, as person goes about their day with a plan to be somewhere at a certain time, the stage is set by pre-deterministic thought that they will arrive at their destination to perform a task, yet life itself brings them to a moment which changes everything and in that moment they have no choice but to live through it.
And that leads us to ask; where those affected supposed to have such an experience to change their thoughts about something important to each individual? In fact there are but few who cannot recall exactly what happened in a brief few seconds during an earthquake or a car accident making them profound moments and then they weigh and measure the value of life thereafter.
But was it predestination to have such an experience so that the individuals due to a cause would in effect change? It might be so and especially if we consider how many drop their keys when going out the door thus changing their schedule by but a few seconds and upon arriving at the scene of an accident having said, “If I hadn’t dropped my keys I would have arrived exactly that that point and been in “that” accident.
Though in looking at couples who meet and marry, the steps through life which brought them together in a finite moment in time and be overwhelmingly attracted to each other is yet another of life’s time dependent related mysteries. Be-cause every step of the way something happened to affect them to afford an attraction to each other. Surely, it’s well beyond random chemistry.
There is a new compromise concept of "free will by consent" where the choice is made from 'prefab dynamical alternatives' stored in pre-motor cortex attractor phase space. The free will precedes the formation of the alternatives which are continuously updated to reflect novel experiences. Somewhere in this 3rd. volume it is discussed. For a generalized view see:
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this<http://delasierra-sheffer.net/ID4-PlasticArt-com/index.htm#_Toc292691009>
Dr.d
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisGeorge Musser starts out
with the questions:
"Do we have autonomy, or are our choices preordained? Is that a false choice?"
That seems a very false choice. How about trying to ask
"In what things do we have "free will" and in what things do we not have "free will?"
"Free" from what?"
"Free to do what?"
Here's my working definition of "free will":
Nothing outside of me - God, or gods, or fate, or someone holding a gun on me or my daughter can directly control my actions independent of my mind, its experiences, its evaluations, its perceptions. They can influence my actions, but they cannot somehow "reach into" my mind and control those actions independent of my mind.
But this is much to simplistic. There are behaviors that the "mind" has nothing to do with.
1. Things like the patellar reflex
2. Instincts like infant sucking.
3. Flight response.
4. Fright induced defecation or urination
5. Conditioned reflexes.
6. I'm sure there are others - perhaps hypnotism?
For me "free will" is something like an empirical hypothesis.
Except for those kinds of things listed above, I know of no force, or mechanism, or factor, that can directly control my behavior without influencing my mind.
That doesn't mean there are no such forces, and that we should not search for them.
That doesn't mean that we cannot list some outside factors that can control some behaviors - a doctor's hammer.
That doesn't mean that we should not try to discover and catalog and characterize what kinds of behaviors can and cannot be caused directly by external factors.
For me to have free will must all my actions be free of this kind of external control? I don't think so.
For me to have free will, is one kind of action that cannot be controlled from outside enough?
How many, or which actions must be free of outside control for me to have free will?
My definition of "free will" does not eliminate the possibility of my actions being determined by
1. the state of my mind
2. the content of my perceptions
3. my values
4. my goals, ....
5. threatening or inducing actions or behavior by others
In fact, I believe that my actions are determined by these things. For me free will is the inability of things outside me to cause my actions without influencing my mind. New information is likely to make me take different actions. But not to reach in and control my motor neurons without influencing other neurons.
I believe it is necessary to define exactly what you mean when saying free will. I seem as if everyone sees free will as something straight forward, and uncomplicated. But what does it really mean. When you make a choice, to what extend do you think it is free. Is it free from influence from your cultural background? Your political convincing? Your educational background? The structure of your neurons? I do not think so. And if a choice is depending on all these factors, how can one perceive it a free?? And what does being free mean in the context?
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisOne can argues that the chemical background of neuronal processing is deterministic or quantum dependent. But what impact does this have on your decision? The decision anyone takes is taken as a consequence of interactions not only between the neurons in the brain, but also interactions between the surroundings of the individual, and as such no choice is free of influence. This makes it difficult for me to see what nature of free that is left for the choice one make. Even in the process of making the choice, the choice is bound to the situation that creates the choice in the first place. Therefore you choice to respond to any situation are tied to the incident that necessitates the choice. You do not make a free choice, you make a dependent choice. If I ask you if you want an ice-cream, it is my question that creates your choice, no matter if you chooses to say yes, no, not respond or respond otherwise. If you tell me that the freedom lies in your choice to choose among the way you respond ( which would still be partly tied) , my answer to you would be that this is only so if you have a mechanism inside your head that is not responding randomly, but respond based on something reasonable. But these reasons would have to come from somewhere, and as they determine your answer, your answer is not free. If your answer is not based on specific reasons, but are random, the again your choice is not free but random.
In the end it all comes down to the definition of free, which could prove quiet difficult to agree on.
We can learn a lot by discussing things without clear, agreed on, consistent, ... definitions. Although definitions, or working definitions or guidelines can be very helpful.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisFrancis Crick is quoted as saying:
"I'd remind you that there was never a time in the history of biology when a bunch of us sat around the table and said, 'Let's first define what we mean by life.' We just went out there and discovered what it was..."
http://www.edge.org/responses/what-is-your-favorite-deep-elegant-or-beautiful-explanation
I think characterizations of "free will", hints about it, hypotheses can be useful but the absence of a consensus definition should not stop us from investigating and thinking about it.
Didn't I explain this just a few Earth days ago? As spokesman for the universe, I tell you that the universe can have only one state at any one time and one total state leads to the next. This mostly applies to each planetary system also, with only a little interconnection. As long as you can't see all of your programming, or the real future, you are free to act as you're programmed.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisTo add to that, everything that can go wrong will and everything that can go right will, because only one set of things can happen at any one time. Get used to it and deal with it.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI have never seen a discussion of determinism vs indeterminism be anything more than a philosophical pillow fight. The observable universe, and the processes that occor within it display qualities that can be described as both, or wither, depending upon the frame of reference of the observer. Further, processes which can be understoodonly in terms of statistical mechanics c an be described ad deterministic or indeterministic, depending upon how one wishes to define the terms.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisFree will has always been a philosophical gordian knot for numerous reasons, several of which the author correctly points out - the terms are not well defined and the arguments tend to jump frames.
Until the terms are defined exactly, and a prefered frame of reference agreed upon, the issue can only be looked at pragmaticaly. The 'will' exists within, and arises from, a material substrate - the brain, with specific architecture and situationaly specific paterns of biological (neuronal) activity. The material substance, and the interactions of its components and architecture are governed by natural law, thus, the will cannot be free of natural law and the material substrate that it arises from and which it is housed within. Yet within those bounds, the 'will', is unconstrained. We are 'free' to think of anything we can conceive, we are free to choose to act in any way we are capable of acting. We are not free to think or act in ways we cannot conceive or which are not physicaly possible.
I conclude that the question is a red herring at worst, and uninteresting at best. A better question is - what is this thing we call 'will'? Not something philosophers can fruitfully address. And since consciousness, like most of biology is emergent, not something that physics on its own can fruitfuly explore.