



Astronauts are even braver than you think. Here's a list of NASA's closest calls during the history of the agency's shuttle program
By Dave Mosher | July 7, 2011 | 10
The launch of space shuttle Atlantis on November 26, 1985, would emerge as a haunting close call in the shadow of the Challenger disaster three months later....[More]
The launch of space shuttle Atlantis on November 26, 1985, would emerge as a haunting close call in the shadow of the Challenger disaster three months later.
Rubber O-rings serve as a seal between segments of the shuttle’s solid rocket boosters and prevent hot gases from escaping as the rocket fuel burns. During Atlantis’s chilly night launch, the cold winter air likely hardened the ring and allowed hot gases to escape through a crack.
The mission went off without a hitch, however, and NASA reported no anomalies even after retrieving the rockets from the ocean and inspecting them.
A similar failure caused space shuttle Challenger to disintegrate 73 seconds into its flight on January 28, 1986, ultimately killing all seven crew members. [Less] [Link to this slide]
Several times during a space shuttle mission, controllers in Houston beam up instructions called a "state vector." The coordinates tell the spaceship exactly where it is above the Earth so it can make extremely precise docking, undocking and reentry maneuvers....[More]
Several times during a space shuttle mission, controllers in Houston beam up instructions called a "state vector." The coordinates tell the spaceship exactly where it is above the Earth so it can make extremely precise docking, undocking and reentry maneuvers.
During the STS-32 mission, however, Mission Control sent up a funky set.
Space shuttle Columbia was in orbit to retrieve a long-duration experiment (shown) from space, and communications noise garbled a state vector sent by Mission Control. The spacecraft beamed back an incorrect confirmation to Houston, and computers there flagged the errors for review. A mission controller looked at the data but inexplicably determined everything was fine and uploaded them to Columbia.
The garbled instructions made Columbia "think" it was close to Earth's core. In response, it fired its thrusters and began to spin about once every couple of minutes. The movement was harmless (no space station existed at the time for Columbia to bang into), but Mission Control woke up the five-person crew led by commander Daniel C. Brandenstein to right the errant yaw. NASA quickly changed its state vector procedures to prevent a similar mishap in the future.
"Uploading the wrong state vector at the wrong time could have serious consequences," Chiao said. "If this happened while an orbiter was at the space station, they could collide."
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When necessary in the past decade or so, NASA has ferried its astronauts to the space station aboard Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft (an option it will be stuck with after Atlantis ’s final launch and until the advent of mature commercial vehicles)....[More]
When necessary in the past decade or so, NASA has ferried its astronauts to the space station aboard Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft (an option it will be stuck with after Atlantis’s final launch and until the advent of mature commercial vehicles).
Chiao’s arrival at the ISS in 2004 aboard a Soyuz was a little more exciting than he liked.
Normally a flight computer and docking system automatically line up and lock the Soyuz in place at the space station. But as Chiao’s spacecraft drew near the ISS, the Soyuz began to accelerate instead of slow down.
"All sorts of alarms were going off, and we started to yaw and lose sight of the space station," Chiao said.
The crew took manual control and stabilized the Soyuz, then stopped it about 50 meters away from the space station—an incredibly close call in the vastness of space.
"After we docked and had a moment to relax, the danger of what happened really hit us," Chiao said. "We could have collided, killed ourselves and maybe even everyone on board the station."
Engineers quickly traced the problem to automated docking system, which supplied incorrect information to the main flight computer. [Less] [Link to this slide]
Technical glitches plagued the first launch of space shuttle Discovery .
After the crew of six (shown here participating in fire training exercises) climbed into the spacecraft for the third time at Launch Pad 39A, a fuel valve in one of the Discovery ’s three main engines failed to open four seconds before launch....[More]
Technical glitches plagued the first launch of space shuttle Discovery.
After the crew of six (shown here participating in fire training exercises) climbed into the spacecraft for the third time at Launch Pad 39A, a fuel valve in one of the Discovery’s three main engines failed to open four seconds before launch. Liquid hydrogen leaked onto the launch pad, lit on fire and burned for 12 minutes while the crew evacuated the space shuttle.
The blunders compiled, as water from the launch pad drenched the astronauts and mission managers failed to order the six-person crew to use the pad’s zip-line-like escape system (it had transported only dummies up to that point in time). [Less] [Link to this slide]
The last thing you want when landing 100 tons of the most complex machine ever built by humans is a flat tire. Or a brake failure.
Both happened to the seven-person crew of the STS-51-D space shuttle mission when they landed at Edwards Air Force Base in California—with U.S....[More]
The last thing you want when landing 100 tons of the most complex machine ever built by humans is a flat tire. Or a brake failure.
Both happened to the seven-person crew of the STS-51-D space shuttle mission when they landed at Edwards Air Force Base in California—with U.S. Senator Edwin Garn (R-Utah) aboard. [Less] [Link to this slide]
The space shuttle's thermal protection system is an armor of heat-resistant tiles that diverts super-heated plasma during reentry. And as NASA was forced to address with the loss of Columbia and its crew in 2003, damage to those tiles is a life-threatening situation....[More]
The space shuttle's thermal protection system is an armor of heat-resistant tiles that diverts super-heated plasma during reentry. And as NASA was forced to address with the loss of Columbia and its crew in 2003, damage to those tiles is a life-threatening situation.
Nearly 15 years before, however—just two flights after the Challenger disaster—a Columbia-like problem occurred: Insulation from the right solid rocket booster of space shuttle Atlantis fell out 85 seconds into the launch and scraped tiles on its starboard side.
The crew inspected the shuttle’s undercarriage in space with a TV camera on the spacecraft’s robotic arm. After seeing the images, shuttle commander Robert Gibson thought he was "going to die" during atmospheric reentry, according to Spaceflight Now[http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts119/090327sts27/].
Because the mission was to deliver a top-secret satellite to space, transmission of TV images to Mission Control was encrypted, low-resolution and slow. When mission managers saw imagery of the tiles they dismissed the anomalies as poor lighting. The crew had a much clearer view and repeatedly voiced their concerns, but found no recourse. NASA would not break encryption for clear TV imagery and reiterated its engineers' assessment.
The extreme nature of the damage became fully apparent once on the ground. One tile was completely missing, and a total of 700 were damaged. The reentry even scorched sections of the orbiter’s thin aluminum skin.
A panel assembled by NASA reviewed the incident and made 10 recommendations, including that the agency should conduct more thorough inspections and improve communication about damage to the thermal protection system. [Less] [Link to this slide]
Space weather is a looming threat for any space flier. Even those cradled in a spacecraft within the Earth’s protective magnetic shield can feel the wrath of solar radiation storms....[More]
Space weather is a looming threat for any space flier. Even those cradled in a spacecraft within the Earth’s protective magnetic shield can feel the wrath of solar radiation storms.
On January 20, 2005, a giant sunspot exploded and flung an X-class solar flare toward the Earth. As high-speed protons arrived at the International Space Station, space fliers on board—including Chiao—hunkered down in well-insulated nooks and crannies of the space station.
Over the next few days, Chiao and cosmonaut Salizhan Sharipov retreated to their hideouts about every 90 minutes—each time the space station completed an Earth orbit. The precaution cut their radiation levels to a modest 1 rem, or one CAT scan’s worth.
Radiation levels of 50 rems outside the ISS during the flare could have sickened a space-walking astronaut. Inside, the worst Chiao and Sharipov probably met was an increase in their lifetime cancer risks.
"It was kind of eerie seeing radiation levels 10 times higher than they should be, and there was nothing you could do about it," Chiao said. "It wasn’t pleasant." [Less] [Link to this slide]
Hydrazine is a nasty fuel that smells like ammonia and can ignite spontaneously when exposed to air.
When the ninth space shuttle mission landed at Edwards Air Force Base in California, hydrazine leaked from an auxiliary power unit on the shuttle and caught fire—but no one at NASA knew until the next day....[More]
Hydrazine is a nasty fuel that smells like ammonia and can ignite spontaneously when exposed to air.
When the ninth space shuttle mission landed at Edwards Air Force Base in California, hydrazine leaked from an auxiliary power unit on the shuttle and caught fire—but no one at NASA knew until the next day.
Technicians found the scorched area only after detaching the rear panel of the spacecraft during post-flight inspection. It is believed the fuel leaked on orbit but immediately froze. Once Columbia and it crew of six touched down on the warm ground, the hydrazine ice melted and the leak resumed. [Less] [Link to this slide]
The space station’s four pairs of solar arrays, each close to a football field long end to end, provide all of the orbital laboratory’s electricity....[More]
The space station’s four pairs of solar arrays, each close to a football field long end to end, provide all of the orbital laboratory’s electricity.
During the STS-120 space shuttle mission, astronauts moved one of the station’s solar-array pairs to a new location, then unfurled them. But when the deployment was about 80 percent finished, one of the golden wings jammed up and ripped.
With a damaged and only partially unfurled sail, the station could not support soon-to-be-delivered rooms and equipment.
So Mission Control engineered a daring repair starring astronaut Scott Parazynski—a medical doctor. He ventured outside the space station, clipped onto the end of the space shuttle’s inspection boom (which was itself attached to a robotic arm) and sewed up the rip with tools wrapped in tape to prevent electrocution.
"It was at the absolute limit we could reach out there, and we sent out our tallest astronaut. He could barely reach," Hale said. "For a moment, the entire space station hung in the balance. It was pretty dramatic." [Less] [Link to this slide]
Space above Earth is a lethal junkyard littered with countless scraps speeding by at tens of thousands of kilometers per hour. The trash runs the gamut from pieces of explosive bolts to farings from rocket nose-cones and, lately, bits of a satellite deliberately blown up by China....[More]
Space above Earth is a lethal junkyard littered with countless scraps speeding by at tens of thousands of kilometers per hour. The trash runs the gamut from pieces of explosive bolts to farings from rocket nose-cones and, lately, bits of a satellite deliberately blown up by China.
All pose serious threats to even the toughest spacecraft, so the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office sometimes alerts NASA if their top-secret system detects something getting dangerously close to a manned spacecraft.
On June 28, the space station had its closest-ever encounter with orbital junk, at about 250 meters away. The object, traveling about 46,700 kph, forced six crew members on board the space station into two docked Soyuz spacecraft ready for a quick escape.
The all-clear came a few minutes later, and orbital life went on as normal. The last time crew members were sent scrambling for the lifeboats was March 12, 2009, when a hunk of a satellite’s motor zipped by the ISS.
In the end, says Hale, these and other dangerous events are a fact of life in spaceflight. [Less] [Link to this slide]
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The Future of Space Exploration
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10 Comments
Add CommentI’d like to add some tweaks to the writeups on two of these ten, that I was directly involved with:
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this#6, Severe Tile Damage due to debris – I was the first person from the Space Shuttle Program Office to go to the lakebed post-landing and assess the damage. Weeks later when the official Incident Investigation Team made its report, they noted that the this debris damage issue was not going away, and officially recommended that a Debris Mitigation Manager be appointed in the Shuttle program office to make sure that never happened again. I was the person selected. However.......when I was promoted away to another job a year later, I was not replaced. My pleas with then Shuttle management that they needed to replace me because this issue of debris coming back and hitting the vehicle was not going to go away...in fact, left unattended, it would probably get worse – were ignored.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Columbia accident 14 years later – which not only cost lives, but billions of dollars – was likely directly a result of not having that single full-time position working over those years to constantly decrease the seriousness of the issue. This was not directly addressed in the official Columbia Accident Investigation Report. The CAIB report did note, however, that the Columbia accident did “(illustrate) the lack of institutional memory in the Space Shuttle Program that supports the Board’s claim...that NASA is not functioning as a learning organization.”
#8: Explosive Landing – was much more dangerous than this short report indicates. Firstly, it wasn’t just one of the 3 APUs (Auxiliary Power Units) that caught fire and was burning; it was two of the three. Second, it didn’t happen after landing – the fires were burning ever since the vehicle hit the atmosphere during entry and all the way thru landing, and continued burning until the two units detonated before the crew did their normal APU shutdown. Two simultaneous fires – the type of failure NASA normally does not consider ‘realistic’ - occurring inside the vehicle (under the tail), with no one really aware they were happening until long after, qualifies to me as the first real ‘close call’ of the program.
Dave Huntsman
Commercial Space Development
NASA
#1: "...and NASA reported no anomalies even after retrieving the rockets from the ocean and inspecting them"
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisNASA has kept a lot of things out of the public eye, apparently now it is becoming okay to talk about them. As a postdoc at JSC I learned that some astronauts come back dehydrated so much as a result of headward fluid shifts in weightlessness that intravenous fluids have been administered to them so they could stand up and walk off the Shuttle. Yet NASA spent millions of dollars on an "emergency egress system" which these same astronauts would have been unable to use, apparently without any consideration or possibly any knowledge of the postflight orthostatic tolerance problem. What happens is that headward fluid shifts stimulate reflexes that tell the body it has too much blood in it, and it goes about the process of reducing its blood volume. Water and electrolytes are rapidly excreted by the kidneys in an attempt to compensate, but blood also contains cells and protein which cannot be reduced rapidly so they remain behind and become concentrated in blood. That concentration raises the osmotic pressure causing fluid to move into the blood from all the other body water compartments, keeping the reflexes activated until the whole-body dehydration is quite severe: astronauts typically return to earth dehydrated by 4% to 6% of their body weight, and some cosmonauts have returned dehydrated by 8% of their body weight. A doctor will call an ambulance and send you to the emergency room if you become dehydrated by 2% of your body weight, so the dehydration of astronauts is not trivial. This problem wasn't understood in the early days of the Shuttle program and for the first two flights neither commander nor pilot wore anti-G suits, after all a good fighter pilot can handle 4.5 G without a suit and just using Valsalva maneuvers to keep blood flowing to their brains, so why would they need G-suits when the Shuttle only produced 2.5 to 3 G on reentry(?) was the logic. The story I was told in all seriousness is that STS-2 came close to crashing on reentry when both pilot and copilot nearly passed out, and which was 'solved' by NASA requiring all astronauts to wear G-suits on reentry afterward, a documented fact. But you never heard that on the evening news either.
Karl Simanonok, Ph.D.
During my time at JSC in the early 90's there were still a few of the Apollo old-timers around, the ones who met JFK's goal of getting a man on the moon before the decade was out by working 30% overtime at no extra pay to make it happen. They were the real heros of the story and the ones I knew inspired and mentored me greatly. I became deeply saddened however to see their Apollo spirit absent among so many of the newcomers who exhibited no sense of shared goals and instead largely devoted their efforts to strengthening and expanding their little fiefdoms, quarreling over lab space constantly, backbiting and even sabotaging the work of their perceived competitors, one of them even tried to steal my primary research idea and call it his own, so it got pretty personal. I was told 'sorry' by his boss and 'NASA has no mechanism for regulating ethics' leaving me to fight the bastard on my own (I eventually won, but at some cost). So I figure it's a good thing NASA is retiring the Shuttle before the devolving attitudes there cause any more crashes. There is a lot to be learned from the Shuttle experiences, but unless more of NASA's dirty laundry is aired like this article just barely begins to scratch the surface doing, some of the most important lessons will be lost and the next generation of spacefarers may have to learn them all over again, and that would be a dirty shame.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisKarl Simanonok, Ph.D.
I am confident that sts107 will eventually cause bitterness.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisI remember #1 reported on the news dec 1985.It was reported as a close call.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisreally? how about this:
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to this*1. The US bank bailout exceeded the half-century lifetime budget of NASA. or *2. The US military spends as much in 23 days as NASA spends in a year - and that's when we're not fighting a war. or *3. The entire half-century budget of NASA equals the current two year budget of the US military.
I would rather have spent the money and gained the technology and knowledge from the space program then bailed a failing bank that shot itself in the foot. Oh and what good did the bail out do? Last I checked we are still in recession and the rich continue to get more rich as they buy up cheap assets.
So, before you try and "bash" NASA maybe you should do some research before posting what you did.
*Tweeted from @NeilTyson.
Just to clarify, the above post was to geojellyroll. Good day.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thissomeone will complain about anything. I suggest Jelly Roll focus on celebrity tweets rather than stressing out on the subject of the exploration of Space.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisThere is more to NASA than the Shuttle program - much more. A huge number of NASA folks are silently breathing a sigh of relief that now it is safe for science and robots to come back into the light.
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisCarbon-based humans are not meant for space exploration. Our job on the evolutionary ladder is to construct our silicon-based descendants, who can be perfectly adapted to space. We've done a heckuva job evolving from lightning bolts & ammonia, but the very adaptions that brought us to this point make us unsuitable for the environments of space.
I doubt it will be the year 2043 predicted by Ray Kurzweil for the first sentient silicon life because we still don't know what that means. Will we make an Einstein, an Adolf Hitler, or a Sally Ride? But as we figure out how to stay alive on this planet, we'll sort out the constructs of intelligence and personality and make self-aware machines that can stand the rigors of space.
I am as proud as the next person to be a part of a race that produced the Space Shuttle. I am even more proud that we produced the two Martian rovers, Spirit & Opportunity, and the Hubble Space Telescope. To infinity, and beyond!
In reply to bender227: I like to compare NASA's budget to what our sociel programs spend. NASA said it would go to the Moon and build the shuttle, and did. HHS and HUD said they would alleviate poverty and fix the slums, and have not. And after forty years, nobody has shown me a single improvement traceable to defunding the Apollo Program and spending the money on "problems here on earth."
Reply | Report Abuse | Link to thisIn reply to ssidner: Spirit and Opportunity are fabulous machines. But in six years they've done as much as two human geologists could do in a couple of days.
What is all too likely to happen is we will decide we no longer need our own manned space flight. We'll just contract it to the Russians and, later, the Chinese. But the money won't be spent on other science. It will be spent funding Lifestyles of the Selfish and Irresponsible. The money will simply disappear and we will get zero in return.